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What accounts for the truly remarkable drop in welfare dependency 
in Canada since the early 1990s? The authors provide a nationwide
empirical analysis of the underlying factors, and draw implications 
for policymakers.
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SOCIAL POLICYHaving seen welfare dependence increase dramatically from the late 1980s into
the early 1990s, Canada has since witnessed an historic decline in this societal
challenge.  This paper explores the recent sea change in dependence on Social
Assistance (SA) and assesses the factors responsible. It first sets the context by
examining the economic and policy environment that framed these movements.
The empirical part of the paper presents the patterns of annual welfare
participation rates along with the underlying entry and exit rates for individuals
in different kinds of households (unattached individuals, couples with and
without children, single parents) based on an analysis of Canada's Longitudinal
Administrative Database. This is followed by a modelling exercise that identifies
the impacts of a variety of factors on SA outcomes. These factors include
economic conditions (as captured by the unemployment rate), SA benefit levels,
the generosity of the Employment Insurance system, and, lastly, a set of influences
not captured by the above factors, such as changes in eligibility rules or procedures
that took place in specific years. These estimates are then used to assess the
contribution of each of these factors on the observed time trends. We find that
the improvements in economic conditions over this period played the largest
single role in explaining the downward trends in SA rates, but that the other
factors also played significant roles. 
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S
ocial assistance – or “welfare” 
to most of us – is a perennial
Canadian economic and social
policy issue. On the one hand, SA 
is a vital economic support for a 
disadvantaged segment of our society.
For families, being on SA usually
reflects impoverishment and in many
cases an exclusion from the social 
and economic mainstream and can
have lasting effects. 
At the same time, SA programs can be costly for
governments, the associated work disincentives can
impede the integration of lower-income and lower-
skilled individuals into the labour market, and
dependence upon welfare at one point in time may
lead to continued or repeat dependency in later years.
In short, while SA exists  for good reason – helping
the less advantaged among us – it implies attendant
costs and unwanted consequences of various types.
In Canada, SA participation rose sharply during the
recession of the early 1990s, even more so than during
the preceding recessions of the 1970s and 1980s.
Furthermore, in those earlier instances, SA levels
remained near the peak recessionary levels after
economic recovery and raised the concern that SA
rates – and SA spending – would stay fixed at those
increased levels when the economy improved.
In response to this most recent rise, however, and in
the context of severe fiscal pressures on governments
at all levels, virtually all provinces instituted changes
aimed at reducing SA rates. Eligibility rules were tight-
ened (especially for new entrants – in some cases
targeted on youth), benefit levels were cut, “snitch”
lines were introduced, and other rule and procedural
changes were instituted. That said, the more
draconian elements of the legislation that was adopted
in the US at about the same time – motivated by
many of the same concerns – were avoided.
Meanwhile, the Canadian economy recovered,
especially after 1996, and subsequently experienced its
longest expansion since the Second World War.
Following these developments, the number of
individuals in SA-dependent households not only fell,
but did so to a truly remarkable degree. Total recipi-
ents fell from a peak of 3.1 million to 1.7 million
individuals by 2005, with a matching drop in real
expenditures on SA from their peak of over $14
billion in 1994.
1 Given the concurrent population
increase, the country has thus experienced an approxi-
mate halving of its SA dependency rate. This is an
event of remarkable proportions.
Prescriptions in this area of social policy are,
however, often very contentious. This is largely
because measures introduced with the intention of
reducing the welfare rolls often increase the financial
hardship faced by those who still manage to receive
benefits, as well as those who are denied benefits
outright. At the same time, such measures can have
positive effects not only in the form of government
savings, but also with respect to the related work
incentive effects, and thus even reduce long-run
dependency. In short, there is pain as well as gain
when welfare rates are targeted, and as a consequence,
very opposing stances are adopted by individuals,
groups and agencies with differing social philosophies.
The objective of this paper is to inform the debates
surrounding SA reform by shedding light on the SA
wave that rose, then fell so strikingly in Canada in
recent years. The main focus is an empirical analysis of
a number of major determinants of SA participation,
which we have carried out using Statistics Canada’s
Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD) – a
large sample of Canadian tax returns. 
In contrast to existing literature, our analysis repre-
sents a national-level study that adds entry rates,
which are increasingly being appreciated as the prime
drivers of SA participation rates, to the incidence
and exit outcomes typically studied.
2 It covers the
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2 A number of interesting and informative provincial-level studies of welfare dynamics have previously been published (e.g., Lemieux and Milligan 2008,
Arneau, Crémieux and Fortin 2005, Charette and Meng 1994, Duclos et al.1999, Lacroix 2000, Barrett and Cragg 1998, and Christophides et al.
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years from 1993 through 2005, thus spanning the
period of greatest interest – that is, from the year SA
rates peaked through to the very recent past, when
they hit almost historic lows (at least by modern
standards).
The principal effects considered are: (i)
demographic characteristics (age, marital status,
place of residence, etc.); (ii) economic conditions (as
captured by the unemployment rate); (iii) SA
benefit levels; (iv) the generosity of the EI system;
and (v) other effects specific to particular calendar
years. The estimates generated by this analysis are
then used to assess the contribution of each of these
sets of factors on the observed time trends in partici-
pation, entry and exit rates. The massive size of the
LAD allows us to carry out this analysis broken
down by family type – unattached individuals,
couples with and without children, single parents –
the record varying in important ways along this
dimension.
All these factors are significant determinants of
welfare outcomes, while the impacts vary by
outcome and family type. We also find that 
improvements in economic conditions played the
largest single role in explaining the downward
trends in SA rates over time. This reflects the
importance of the unemployment rate on individ-
uals’ participation, entry, and exit rates at any
particular point in time and the substantial 
decline in unemployment rates observed over the
period in question. We also find, however, that 
other factors were also important in reducing
welfare rates. 
The paper develops as follows. Section two details
the economic and policy environment over the
period 1993 – 2005  at the provincial and federal
levels. Because SA is primarily a provincial jurisdic-
tion, and provinces have differed substantially in
their approaches to reform, we provide greater detail
regarding the experiences of three large provinces
that account for 60 percent of Canada’s population
(and where substantial changes in SA policy have
taken place) – British Columbia, Alberta and
Ontario. The third section details the Longitudinal
Administrative Database, and the fourth section
presents the trends in welfare dynamics by family
type and province based on these data. Section five
reports the findings of our econometric modelling,
identifies the effect of each of the major factors
considered on the SA outcomes of interest, and
assesses the importance of each of these influences
on the observed declines in SA rates from their
peaks in the early 1990s to the present time. A
concluding section reviews the major findings, and
puts these in the context of current SA policy
discussions.
The Economic and Policy
Environment
Developments at the National Level
Prior to the mid-1990s in Canada, as in several
other western (mainly European) countries, many
social policy analysts had become almost fatalistic
about the prospects of reducing the number of
dependents on SA. This resulted from the fact that
the preceding two economic cycles had significantly
ratcheted up the rate of SA dependence, but the rolls
had declined only very modestly during the subse-
quent recovery periods.
3
In 1980/81 for example, prior to the imminent
recession, the number of recipients was 1.4 million,
and this increased to 1.89 million by 1983/84
(Human Resources Development Canada 2002). Yet,
even though the economy had well recovered from
the recession by 1988/89, the number of welfare
recipients in that year was similar to what it was in
1983/84 (albeit population growth meant that the
rate was slightly lower). A similar pattern had charac-
terized the slowdown in the early 1970s.
Such patterns prompted Lindbeck (1995) to
write in despair on “hazardous welfare state
dynamics,” meaning that increases in the
generosity of social programs could generate
undesired and unforeseen dependence. His most
specific concern was that recessions have the
capacity to reduce the stigma effects of SA
programs, because they put more people in a
position of dependence and thus change social
norms as more people become comfortable with
3 Courchene (1994) has chronicled this in detail.
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4 See CANSIM table 282-0085
being on SA and less concerned with getting 
back into the labour market, especially in the
longer run. 
What is remarkable about Canada’s experience
with SA (and equally with Employment Insurance)
recipiency in the late 1990s is that its pattern
marked a complete break with those of  the
previous two recessions. 
First, the economy lingered through a deep
recession in the early 1990s but then, especially
after 1996, recovered strongly, with the unemploy-
ment rate dropping five percentage points from its
peak rate through 2005.
4This improvement in the
job market provided many individuals a greater
opportunity to escape from – or avoid entering –
welfare dependency. But macroeconomic improve-
ment can only be part of the story, because earlier
cyclical expansions were not accompanied by such
dramatic declines in recipiency.
Meanwhile, the real value of SA (and related)
benefits fell, and in many cases by large amounts.
Table 1 shows these changes on a biennial basis
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
N&L Single 5,430 5,582 5,655 5,528 1,546 1,545 3,583 8,468 8,198
Parent, 1C* 15,273 15,957 16,239 15,869 16,353 16,894 16,845 16,433 16,181
Couple, 2C 18,726 18,818 18,539 18,123 18,680 19,641 19,911 19,666 19,578
PEI Single 10,030 10,264 10,229 7,154 6,525 6,353 6,393 6,406 6,214
Parent, 1C 15,393 15,952 15,973 15,008 13,821 13,445 13,704 13,875 13,707
Couple, 2C 23,417 24,165 23,897 22,615 21,058 20,505 21,216 21,393 21,213
NS Single 8,511 7,996 7,628 7,456 5,474 5,268 5,268 5,407 5,422
Parent, 1C 15,162 15,458 15,106 14,991 14,520 14,468 13,398 13,027 12,917
Couple, 2C 20,148 19,470 18,896 18,472 19,687 19,162 20,235 19,031 19,032
NB Single 4,122 4,243 4,072 4,025 3,983 3,879 3,690 3,521 3,427
Parent, 1C 12,610 12,718 12,693 13,623 13,644 14,191 14,095 13,773 13,656
Couple, 2C 14,827 15,148 15,195 16,195 16,341 17,476 17,724 17,540 17,567
Que Single 5,128 7,774 7,898 7,573 7,227 7,169 7,016 7,035 6,947
Parent, 1C 13,717 13,951 16,032 16,010 14,990 14,927 14,565 14,646 15,395
Couple, 2C 18,890 19,642 20,322 19,674 18,351 18,456 18,503 18,802 20,704
Ont Single 9,091 10,447 10,663 9,927 8,084 7,859 7,469 7,117 7,0 07
Parent, 1C 17,841 20,805 20,995 19,598 16,205 15,779 15,123 14,486 14,451
Couple, 2C 23,392 27,750 27,928 25,741 21,421 20,861 20,047 19,227 19,302
Man Single 8,709 8,981 8,894 8,133 6,567 6,395 6,078 5,794 5,818
Parent, 1C 14,269 14,432 14,238 13,843 13,405 13,050 13,485 13,475 13,282
Couple, 2C 24,450 25,605 23,891 23,728 20,112 19,383 19,385 19,680 20,357
Sask Single 7,052 6,957 7,448 6,684 6,472 6,611 6,599 6,466 6,663
Parent, 1C 15,904 15,544 15,122 14,771 14,305 13,682 13,694 13,102 13,235
Couple, 2C 22,731 22,047 21,736 21,320 19,625 20,264 20,204 19,522 19,327
Alb Single 6,970 7,492 7,013 6,019 5,862 5,787 5,501 5,244 5,050
Parent, 1C 14,468 15,030 14,373 13,194 12,859 13,105 12,707 12,383 12,326
Couple, 2C 22,129 23,735 22,661 21,217 20,629 20,643 20,117 19,546 19,497
BC Single 7,847 7,793 8,302 8,353 7,490 7,292 7,062 6,708 6,456
Parent, 1C 15,699 16,126 16,688 16,736 16,149 15,737 15,387 14,232 13,948
Couple, 2C 20,508 20,851 21,726 21,876 21,066 20,541 20,136 18,826 18,466
Table 1. Welfare Benefits per Family Group in Canada’s Provinces, 2005 constant dollars
* C denotes child or children.
Source: National Council of Welfare
http://www.ncwcnbes.net/documents/researchpublications/ResearchProjects/WelfareIncomes/2005Report_Summer2006/Factsheets/Factsheet03ENG.pdf| 4 Commentary 267
1989–2005, and although the trends varied by
province and family type, some of the declines were
substantial. For example, payments declined signifi-
cantly to single individuals and single-parent house-
holds in Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, Alberta and
British Columbia.
5 Consequently, by the end of this
period, payments typically provided recipients with
less assistance – expressed as a percent of Statistics
Canada’s low-income cut-off (LICO) –  than in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Such absolute and
relative declines in the value of SA payments
provided strong incentives for individuals to seek
alternatives to SA.
6
Third, many provincial governments changed the
rules governing the receipt of SA and related admin-
istrative procedures. Examples include the employ-
ment of additional monitors, the opening of “snitch
lines,” the introduction of requirements that recipi-
ents collect their cheques rather than having them
mailed out, and so on.
7 Again, these changes would
be expected to reduce SA participation rates. Three
provinces were particularly aggressive in reducing
SA use, though not in identical ways – Alberta was
the first mover in 1993, followed by Ontario in
1995 and British Columbia in 2002. 
At the broader political level, this period also saw
a major transformation in the manner of federal-
provincial funding for SA. Welfare is provincially
operated, but funded at least in part by the federal
government, and in recent years has become more
integrally related to direct federal support of families.
The federal government took two radical steps in its
1995 budget. First, it cut transfers to the provinces.
Second, it altered the method of transferring funds,
by introducing a lump-sum transfer to cover SA,
health, and postsecondary education under the
Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). From
being a shared-cost program (called the Canada
Assistance Plan, or CAP), SA expenditures became
part of a fixed per capita transfer and thus were the
full responsibility of provincial governments,
thereby changing the financial incentives of
provinces with respect to spending on SA.
8These
changes were seen both as a means of reducing the
federal government’s deficit, and as a way of
imposing discipline on provincial governments.
Two other developments in Canadian federal
programs with implications for SA participation
took place in the 1990s. The Child Tax Benefit
(CTB) was introduced in 1993, replacing the
Family Allowance and Working Income
Supplement, and the CTB was replaced, in turn, by
the National Child Benefit (NCB) in 1998, which
included the National Child Benefit Supplement
(NCBS). These programs have been targeted on
lower-income families with children. The NCBS, in
particular, is designed to provide greater incentives
to parents on welfare to return to work by effectively
reducing the amount of income support that is lost
when they move into the labour market. Most
provinces, by agreement, reduced SA payments to
households with children by an amount equal to
their savings due to the introduction of the federal
program, on the understanding that these savings
would be invested in other programs benefiting
children and families with children.
Another significant related policy development in
this period was a general tightening of the rules
governing the receipt of Employment Insurance
(EI). Major changes to EI in 1990, 1994 and 1996
effectively increased the barriers and reduced the
benefits available to recipients.
9The impact of
tighter EI regulations on the number of SA recipi-
ents is, however, indeterminate: individuals may
substitute SA for EI as the latter becomes less avail-
able and less generous, thus driving SA participation
5 Payments include the basic SA benefit, federal and provincial child benefits, and federal and provincial tax credits.
6 See National Council of Welfare (2006).
7 National Council of Welfare  (1997).
8 The pre-existing system was, however, open-ended only up to a point. Increases in SA spending by provincial governments in principle meant an
automatic commitment on the part of the federal government, but when increases in the CAP payments became too great in the eyes of the federal
government in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it imposed a limit on annual transfer increases (“capping the CAP”) to the provinces of Ontario,
Alberta and British Columbia, thereby transferring spending responsibility at the margin wholly over to those provincial governments.
9 EI operates on the basis of variable work requirements and variable weeks of benefits: individuals living in higher unemployment regions
require a smaller number of hours of work (formerly weeks of work) to qualify for benefits, and qualify for more weeks of benefits than
individuals living (or more precisely, filing) in low unemployment regions.
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upward. Alternatively, more stringent EI regulations
may induce individuals to stay at their jobs longer
(or search harder for an alternative job if faced with
unemployment) rather than enter onto an EI-SA
cycle.
To summarize this period: the 1990s were charac-
terized by several well-defined economic and policy
developments with important implications for SA
participation. The decade started with a lingering
recession but this was followed by strong growth
after 1996. On the policy front, some provinces
reduced the generosity of SA benefits and many
instituted rule and procedural changes that made
benefits more difficult and more onerous to obtain;
federal funding for SA was combined into a lump
sum payment that also covered health and postsec-
ondary education, and overall payments were cut.
As well, the CTB/NCB and the associated low-
income supplement were introduced partly with the
objective of taking children off welfare and
increasing their parents’ incentives to earn more
income through paid work. EI eligibility was tight-
ened and benefit levels were reduced. Furthermore,
it can be assumed that there were interactions
among these developments; for example, changes in
SA program administration may have had a greater
impact in an expanding economy with a greater
demand for labour, or when people become more
fully aware of SA program changes. The relative
importance of these developments and reforms is
critical for policymakers. 
Developments in the United States
Similar changes were taking place in the US over the
same period, but they took a distinctly different
form. The US also switched from a federal-to-state,
shared-cost system to a lump-sum transfer, while the
new Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF)
welfare program included a five-year lifetime limit
on the receipt of welfare, regulations on the return
to work after childbirth, “workfare” requirements,
and penalties for rule breakers. In addition, the US
Earned Income Tax Credit was enhanced, the
minimum wage was increased, and benefits and
support targeted on individuals moving from
welfare dependence to work were strengthened as
part of the new “make work pay” philosophy. The
number of caseloads fell precipitously, although the
evidence suggests that the TANF reforms, the other
incentives for low-skill individuals, and the
expanding economy have all been important in
reducing recent welfare use (see for example Moffitt
2002, or Mueser et al. 2000).
Developments in Specific Provinces: Some
Major Policy Initiatives
Of the four most populous provinces, accounting
for 80 percent of the economy’s population, three
embarked on major SA disincentive programs at
different points during this period: Alberta, Ontario
and British Columbia. (Quebec is the exception.)
The measures adopted by these provinces varied
considerably. 
ALBERTA: Alberta was the first province in Canada
to undertake a major overhaul of its welfare
system. Even though it had the lowest rate of
welfare recipiency in Canada in the early 1990s,
the government of the day undertook to make
welfare less appealing and more difficult to access
in 1993. For example, first-time applicants were
refused and instructed to seek work and were
reconsidered only after proving that they had
searched for work. As well, more frequent checks
were made on eligibility and possible fraud.
Subsequently, benefit levels were reduced. 
The impact of these changes appears to have been
substantial, even allowing for improving economic
conditions. Based on data from what was then the
Alberta Department of Family and Social Services,
Boessenkool (1997) reports that the quarterly inflow
at the end of 1992 stood at 37,000, dropped to
25,000 by mid-1993, and then to 20,000 by 1996.
The largest effect therefore took place immediately
following the initial administrative (access barrier)
reforms, while a part of the decline was likely due to
the later benefit reductions and improving
economic conditions. The greater part of the entry
reduction was attributed to first-time applicant
refusals rather than refusals of repeat applicants. 
Reductions in participation by every family type
were registered between 1992 and 1996, although
single-parent families experienced the smallest
reduction (39 percent). Likewise, every age group| 6 Commentary 267
10 The National Council of Welfare (1997) indicates that the number of clients at the Edmonton food bank doubled during this period.
Nonetheless, this was accompanied by a very substantial increase in the proportion of food bank recipients who were actually receiving welfare
in the later period, and a corresponding reduction in the percentage not on welfare. 
11 http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/cs/sp/sdc/socpol/tables/pre/tab361.shtml
12 Reitsma-Smith and Wallace (2004), based on data from the Ministry of Human Resources, British Columbia. 
experienced large participation declines, though these
were greatest for the “under-20” group. Three years
after the first administrative changes were imple-
mented, the number of beneficiaries in the system had
fallen to about 50,000 from 95,000 initially. 
The obvious concern about such reforms is that
rejected claimants will find themselves poorer, “on
the street,” involved in crime, seeking welfare in an
adjoining province, or claiming benefits under
Employment Insurance (then called Unemployment
Insurance). Boessenkool (1997) finds little evidence
for these outcomes, and claims many rejected
claimants were directed back into the educational
system and to training and work projects, although
it is difficult to know the true effects of the policy,
and others have reported less positive indicators.
10 In
addition, it cannot be forgotten that the economy in
Alberta at this time was performing better than in
the rest of Canada, which obviously would have
helped cut into welfare case loads.
ONTARIO:The cutbacks to welfare in Ontario, in
contrast to Alberta, came primarily in the form of
rate reductions, and secondarily in the form of
increased barriers to recipiency. In the June 1995
election campaign Mike Harris and his Progressive
Conservative Party promised voters a “common
sense revolution” that included income tax reduc-
tions, cuts in welfare rates and mandatory work-for-
welfare programs. Subsequently, welfare benefits
were cut in October 1995 by 21.6 percent for all
recipients, aside from people with disabilities and
seniors, which represented a dramatic change of
direction from the preceding New Democratic Party
and Liberal Party governments. 
Ontario was hit particularly hard by the recession
that began in 1990, and unemployment increased
dramatically – virtually doubling between 1989 and
1991. The number of welfare-dependant individuals
climbed to 929,900 in 1991 and further to almost
1.4 million by 1994.
11 Meanwhile, the government’s
finances were sharply affected by the federal govern-
ment’s decision in 1990 to limit increases in federal
SA cost-sharing to Ontario, Alberta and BC to 5
percent per annum.
BRITISH COLUMBIA: In British Columbia, welfare
reform was launched in 2002 by the Campbell
Liberal government with the twin objectives of (a)
reducing the welfare caseloads in BC – out of the
belief that welfare developed a culture of depend-
ency, and (b) reducing the share of the provincial
budget going to welfare. 
The legislation was strongly influenced by the
TANF developments in the US, and the idea that
gainful employment was the key to reducing welfare
recipiency, and that training, education and
community work/service were of secondary impor-
tance in achieving this objective. The legislation also
seems to have been influenced by the Alberta legisla-
tion of 1993. One key aspect was a two-year limit
on benefits for “employable” welfare recipients
without children in any cumulative five-year
window, albeit with some exceptions after criticisms
of the law. It also included a requirement that new
applicants be financially independent for two
consecutive years before being eligible for benefits;
an obligatory employment search period of three
weeks (after contacting the Ministry for support)
before individuals were able to formally apply for
assistance (with room for appeal in cases where this
would cause unnecessary hardship); the introduc-
tion of on-line information and orientation sessions,
which may have provided barriers to the less
educated in particular; and some degree of privatiza-
tion and the involvement of non-profit sector and
charitable agencies. It should be noted, however,
that the dollar values of benefits were not decreased.
The number of entrants declined dramatically, from
approximately 8,000 per month in 2001/02 to about
half this number by the end of 2004, and the average
monthly caseload dropped from 155,000 to 108,000.
12
There was also a significant structural shift in the
composition of claimants, away from the “expected
to work” category and towards those categories
involving “disability,” having “multiple barriers to
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work,” or being “temporarily excused” (as a result of
having a medical condition or being a single parent
with a child under three). While the “expected to
work” category accounted for 75 percent of all
claimants in 2001/02, it accounted for just 30
percent by 2004. Wallace et al. (2006) indicate that
essentially the entire drop in cases in this period was
due to a decline for this group.
As with the other provinces discussed above, we
know little about the ultimate impact of these
measures on the poverty or employment status of
those individuals whose welfare applications were
rejected or who did not even apply because of the
changes. While we know that the number of
homeless in Vancouver and its catchment area
increased by several hundred during these years (see
City of Vancouver 2005),
13 how much of this might
be attributable to a tightening of welfare access is
difficult to say. As with all of these major changes in
system operation, an analysis of the “rejection” impact
on individuals’ subsequent status and labour-market
outcomes is a challenging research agenda due at least
partly to the data required to carry out such a study,
and the difficulty in identifying who would have had
what experience in the absence of the changes. 
The Data, Samples, and Unit of Analysis
The Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD) is
a 20 percent representative sample of Canadian tax
filers, constructed from Canada Revenue Agency
records, which follows individuals over time and
matches them into family units on an annual basis,
thus providing individual- and family-level informa-
tion on incomes, taxes, and basic demographic
characteristics in a dynamic framework. The general
characteristics of the LAD, the selection procedures
used to create the samples used here, and other
related data issues are discussed in detail in Finnie,
Irvine and Sceviour (2004).
The large number of observations in the LAD
allows for a robust and detailed analysis of SA partici-
pation and SA dynamics, including the breakdowns
by family type and province presented here. The
income information is detailed, and of excellent
quality, including that regarding the receipt of SA.
14
We restrict our analysis to individuals aged 18 to
64. Our methodology eliminates students and others
in the early stages of the transition to economic
independence who either are not eligible for SA (rules
vary by province), or for whom SA status has a
different significance than for others. Older individ-
uals are deleted because they are not eligible for SA,
and qualify instead for other income-support programs,
including the Guaranteed Income Supplement.
We also delete all individuals who show evidence of
a disability at the family level (i.e., the individual or
his or her spouse) over the given five-year period.
While these represent an important and interesting
class of SA recipients, we chose to restrict the present
analysis to the able-bodied class of SA recipient (or
potential recipient), and to leave the disabled for a
separate study.
In this study, we examine individual behaviour
within a family context by classifying everyone as
belonging to one of the following family types: single
(i.e., no spouse and no children), married with no
children, married with children, or lone parent.
15
An individual is defined as receiving SA in any
particular year if he/she reports SA income of at least
$101 at the family level (i.e., the respondent and/or
his or her spouse declare SA income in this amount).
Using the $101 cut-off minimizes the effects of
reporting and coding errors, and otherwise counts
very small amounts as being (effectively) zero. The
family basis of the measure is used because typically
only one person in a family receives SA, and reports it
on his or her tax form, while SA is awarded for the
entire family – known as a “case.”
16
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13 The City of Vancouver report indicates that “Preliminary data from the March 2005 regional homeless survey shows a doubling in the count
of the number of street homeless and those staying in shelters in the region – from about 1,000 homeless in 2002 to about 2,100. There was a
similar doubling within the city from about 600 to about 1,300.”
14 SA income was not reliably reported previous to 1993.
15 Those in common law relationships are classified as being married.
16 The LAD uses a census definition of the family – one that consists of a husband and wife (with or without children who have never been
married, regardless of age) or a parent with one or more children never married, living in the same dwelling. For a three-generation family, the
second and third generation are treated as one family unit, while the first generation family is also treated as one family unit.| 8 Commentary 267
The definition of entry into SA is straightforward:
for any two consecutive years, entry is deemed to
have occurred in the second year if the individual is
not on SA (as defined above) in the first year, but is
on SA in the second. An exit is defined to have
occurred in the first of a two-year period if the
person was on SA then, but not the next.
These definitions draw attention to the annual
nature of the data: SA analyses are more frequently
based on monthly data, which is how SA is adminis-
tered by the provinces (individuals qualify on a
month-to-month basis), but here we examine
participation, entry and exit on an annual basis.
This approach, driven by the tax-based nature of the
data, differentiates our analysis from province-based
studies using a monthly time frame. The principal
disadvantage of the annual approach is that in cases
where an individual moves on and off SA over the
course of a year, we do not observe those
movements, and instead simply record that the
individual was on SA at some point over the year in
question. But while missing such intra-year
dynamics might be considered a limitation, an
annual perspective may also be seen as providing a
more robust, longer-term measure of SA participa-
tion precisely because it ignores short-run
movements. 
Trends in Welfare Use
Incidence
Figure 1a shows the percentage of all individuals
receiving SA in each year from 1993 to 2005 based
on our analysis of the LAD data (see line denoted
“Total”). A plateau characterizes the period between
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Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).
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1993 and 1995, at almost 12 percent. The rate
declines steadily thereafter, bottoming out at the
end of the time frame at a rate of just above 6
percent. 
Figure 1a also shows the patterns for the four
different household types – singles/unattached, lone
parents, couples with children, and couples without
children. Differences are in evidence here: single
parent households and couples with children experi-
enced larger declines in SA incidence than
unattached individuals and couples without
children. This greater decline involving households
with children may be attributable in part to the
expansion of Canada’s support for low-income
parents through the NCB supplement. Nonetheless,
all groups experienced a substantial decline in recipi-
ency relative to the 1993–1995 plateau. 
Just as there are differences among households,
there are also differences in the provincial patterns,
as illustrated in Figure 1b. While the general
downward pattern is similar, timing is very different
across the provinces, as is the extent of the
percentage decline from the peak of the dependency.
For example, the chart indicates that Alberta
witnessed a major decline early on (1993–1994),
whereas British Columbia witnessed one in the
2002–2004 period.
Figure 1b:  SA rates 1993 – 2005 By Province and Region




























The percentage of groups for all family types in the Atlantic Provinces and Prairies is a weighted average using the population of the component provinces.
Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).| 10 Commentary 267







































































































The percentage of groups for all family types in the Atlantic Provinces and Prairies is a weighted average using the population of the component provinces.
Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).
Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).
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Entry
The entry rates shown in Figure 2a provide a depar-
ture point for understanding the dynamics under-
lying these annual participation rates. In 1994 the
entry rate was just over 2 percent; it fell to 1.5
percent by 1997/98 and bottomed out at just above
1 percent in 2000, where it has remained (see line
denoted “Total”). Figure 2a also shows the patterns
by household type, and in all cases there were
substantial declines. Lone parents are again
especially notable: while they have the highest entry
rate in every year, they also exhibit the largest
absolute decline through time.
17
As with the incidence rates, couples had lower
entry rates in every year than lone parents and
singles, and more moderate declines over time. The
declines are, however, still very large in relative
terms. Singles again lie between the single parents
and two-adult households.
For completeness, the entry rates by province are
presented in Figure 2b.
Overall, these patterns suggest that declining
entry rates played a substantial role in explaining the
fall in SA use.
Exits
Exit trends, in contrast to the entry rates, have been
less uniform. Exit rates would normally be expected
to rise as the economy improves, but with rapidly
declining entry rates, the stock of SA participants is
likely to change in character. In particular, a
substantial decline in entry rates may lead to a more
dependent pool of SA participants that finds exit
more difficult, pushing exit rates downward, and
there may have been other composition effects that
worked in either direction. Figure 3a shows the
national trend (see line denoted “Total”).
Interestingly, there is little discernable movement
in this series – a mild inverted U over the period.
17 Entry rates are defined by family type in the first of each pair of years. Individuals who become dependent upon SA when they divorce,
become single parents, or otherwise change their family type are counted according to their status before entry. A similar treatment is adopted
for exit rates.





















































p18 See Finnie, Irvine and Sceviour (2004) for a description of the models (estimated over a somewhat shorter period) which have been used to
generate the results presented here. 
19 Canada has about 65 economic regions (they vary over time). Very large cities have their own regions, while the smaller provinces have just one
or two regions each. Using the unemployment rate at the level of the economic region allows for a more localized measure of economic condi-
tions as compared to, say, the provincial level rate, and has proved to be a superior performer than the provincial rate in the models we
estimate. It is also important to include this measure as a control in the presence of the EI generosity variable, as explained below.
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However, this aggregate conceals divergent patterns
by household type.
Figure 3a also indicates that the exit rate for lone
mothers doubled from 10 percent to 20 percent
during the period, and went from being the lowest
at the start of the period to the middle of the range
by the end of the period. Singles, in contrast, after
an initial increase, experienced a steady decline in
exit rates and had the lowest rates at the end of the
period. Couples with children had the highest exit
rates in almost all years, these increasing over time.
Couples without children started with the highest
exit rates, but by the end of the period had the same
level as lone mothers – substantially lower than
couples with children.
Exit rates by province are available in an online
Supplementary Data Appendix at www.cdhowe.org
Overall, then, exit rates by household type have
displayed considerable differences in behaviour over
time, especially when compared to entry rates. 
The large falls in annual SA participation rates seen
above thus appear to be explicable in terms of 
(i) dramatically declining entry rates for all family
types, and (ii) reinforcing (i.e., higher) trends in exit
rates for lone parents and couples with children, 
but counteracting decreases in exit rates for singles
and couples without children.
Behind the Trends: Which Factors
Matter Most?
The Analytical Framework 
In this section we attempt to identify the relative
importance of a number of policy-relevant factors in
the downward trend in SA participation rates, as
well as entry and exit rates, over the 1993–2005
period. The factors that are considered are (i) the
decline in the unemployment rate, (ii) changes
(generally decreases) in the generosity of the EI
system, (iii) changes (almost uniformly declines) in
the real benefit levels available to those receiving SA,
and (iv) a set of residual calendar year effects which
capture various influences not otherwise represented
in the models, including policy measures such as the
tightening of eligibility rules, changes in procedures
that might deter participation, and so on. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES:We estimate a set of econo-
metric models where the dependent variables are (i)
the probability that a person is in receipt of SA
benefits in a given year, (ii) the probability that a
person who is not on SA in a given year enters SA
from that year to the next, and (iii) the probability
that a person who is already receiving SA leaves SA in
a given year – i.e., the outcomes whose trends have
been tracked above.
18The modelling approach allows
us to estimate the impact of each explanatory variable
on the probability that a person is on, enters, or exits
SA in a given year, while simultaneously controlling
for the other factors included in the models.
CONTROL VARIABLES:These models include, first of
all, a set of demographic variables such as the
individual’s sex, age, number of children (where
relevant), province of residence, language (French or
English), and the population size of the area lived in
(ranging from large urban to rural). These variables
are, however, included principally as controls and do
not enter the focus of our analysis because (a) they
are generally not as directly policy relevant as the
other variables considered, and (b) they turn out to
have little role in explaining the observed trends
(largely because the underlying demographic charac-
teristics of the population do not change a great deal
over the relevant period).
ECONOMIC AND POLICY VARIABLES: Of greater
importance is the inclusion of the three economic
and policy variables. The first of these is the
unemployment rate of the economic region in
which the person resides.
19The unemployment rate
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is expected to be positively related to the probability
of being on SA in a given year, to have a similarly
positive effect on entry from one year to the next,
and to have a negative effect on exits.
The second policy variable included in the
models is a measure of the generosity of Canada’s
Employment Insurance system (EI – or UI in earlier
years). This measure was developed and subse-
quently refined by Arneau, Crémieux and Fortin
(1998) and Sargent (1995). The index basically
incorporates the key parameters of the EI program
such as the number of weeks (or hours) of work
required to qualify for benefits, the number of
weeks for which benefits can be received, and
benefit (income replacement) levels. 
The expected effect of a change in EI benefits on
SA is uncertain. On the one hand, if unemployment
represents a “gateway” to SA (i.e., individuals first go
on EI then cycle through SA), then a less generous
EI system could reduce dependency on SA, as
individuals are more likely to stay in their jobs or to
search harder for alternative employment instead of
seeking EI and then moving onto SA. Alternatively,
individuals might cycle onto SA from EI more
quickly (thus pushing up SA entry and participation
rates) if they lose EI benefits sooner in a less
generous EI system. On the other hand, if SA is a
substitute for EI (i.e., individuals in some sense
choose to go onto either SA or EI), a less generous
EI  system could increase SA participation, as
individuals choose the latter over the former. 
The EI generosity (or “disincentives”) index varies
over time and across unemployment regions, as
officially defined, which are closely related to, but
distinct from, the economic regions for which our
unemployment rate is measured. There is also varia-
tion in the index related to the changes to the EI
system made in the 1990s, with these independent
changes helping to identify the parameter.
20
The third variable upon which we focus is a
measure of the SA benefit levels available to the
individual’s family should they qualify for the
program. The particular measure used here is a
series published by the National Welfare Council
that gives the maximum amounts normally available
to certain specific family types in each province,
those family types being a couple with two children,
a single parent with one child, and an unattached
individual.
21 Benefit levels vary by province and over
time for a given family type, these variations identi-
fying the effects in question. Families of slightly
different types (e.g., different numbers of children)
are covered by the same index, since benefit rates
within these types have moved closely together over
time, thus rendering the “index” meaningful for our
purposes for the different family types we study.
Finally, each of the models includes a series of
calendar year dummy variables. These will capture any
year-specific effects that remain once the other mea-
sured factors are accounted for, including the influ-
ences of other policy changes not otherwise specified,
such as changes in SA eligibility rules, the enforcement
of these rules, and so on, as discussed above.
The Model Results
In the following section, we show the effects of the
different sets of variables included in the models on
the trends in SA participation, entry, and exit rates
over time using simulations based on the model
estimates. First, however, we discuss the estimates
upon which those simulations are based.
THE (ANNUAL) INCIDENCE/PARTICIPATION MODELS
We start with the “participation” or “incidence”
models, where the dependent variable is the proba-
bility of being on SA in a given year. The full
description of the model and the results are in the
Appendix of this paper.
22
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20 Note the importance of including the unemployment rate measured at the local level (economic region) in order to control for economic
conditions when estimating the effects of the EI system, since its generosity (and thus the index we include in our models) varies with the
unemployment rate and would pick up those effects were no such control included. Less complete (less sophisticated) measures of the
generosity of the EI system were experimented with (e.g., certain specific parameters of the system, such as work requirements and replacement
ratios) and generated similar but not quite as good results (higher standard errors, etc.) as those of the index we employ, which is consistent
with the chosen index in fact being a true, and better, measure of the generosity of the EI system.
21 For couples with no children, we use 1.5 times the individuals’ rate.
22 Also, see Finnie, Irvine and Sceviour (2004) for the full set of results based on a shorter period of time.| 14 Commentary 267
The baseline probabilities provide the point of
departure for calculating the effects of each of the
variables included in the models. The probability
that a person is on SA is related to a higher or lower
value of the variable being changed. The unemploy-
ment rate has a strong effect on SA participation: a
one-point decrease is associated with a decline in the
probability of being on SA of between .37 and 1.62
percentage points (for couples without children and
single parents, respectively). These results thus
suggest that the significant declines in unemploy-
ment rates that occurred through the latter part of
the 1990s were responsible for a substantial share of
the decline in SA rates from their peak levels in the
early and mid-1990s – as will be seen when the
simulation results are presented below.
The EI generosity index, whose effects were not
predictable a priori, shows mixed influences. The
results suggest that the reduced generosity of EI
programs in the later part of the 1990’s reduced SA
participation rates for singles and couples with and
without children. This is consistent with the
“gateway” hypothesis, whereby individuals might be
less likely to enter an EI-SA cycle when EI
generosity is diminished. For single parents,
however, EI and SA tend to be substitutes for these
groups, and when the one program (i.e., EI) is made
less generous, individuals tend to increase their
participation in the other – i.e., SA.
SA benefit levels also appear to be strongly related
to SA participation rates, especially for single
parents. Our results indicate that a change in benefit
levels of $1,000 affects SA participation rates about
as much as a one percent change in the unemploy-
ment rate for singles, couples with children, and
couples without children, but even more strongly
for single parents – benefit levels matter (relatively)
more than economic conditions and job availability
for this latter group. The significant general declines
in benefit rates over this period (e.g., by around
$5,000 for single mothers in Ontario) thus appear
to have been another important determinant of the
changes in SA participation rates seen through the
latter part of the 1990s. 
A calendar year variable reflects the differences in
the probability of an individual being on SA across
years after controlling for the economic/policy
variables included in the models. The year variables
indicate that – after controlling for these factors as
well as individuals’ personal and family attributes –
SA rates for at least the first three groups remained
high through the 1990s and only turned down
(relative to those levels) after 2000 or 2001, and
even then the declines were relatively moderate. 
The model results thus suggest that this decline
was largely due to the declining unemployment rate,
the declining SA benefit levels, and the reduced EI
generosity that occurred over this period, while the
underlying “structure” of SA remained fairly
constant through the end of the decade after rising
in the first year or two of the data period. The
exception is single parents, whose rates turned down
slightly sooner (starting in 1999) and then fell
sharply. We thus suspect that other year-specific
effects apart from those captured by our unemploy-
ment rate, EI generosity, and SA benefit measures
had a greater impact on the time trends observed 
for this group, including the sorts of particular 
SA-related policy measures discussed earlier 
(e.g., eligibility rules).
THE ENTRY MODELS: WHO IS MOST LIKELYTO
GO ON SOCIAL ASSISTANCE? The entry model
weighs the variables that influence the probability of
entering SA from one year to the next for those not
currently on SA. These models may be viewed as the
“cleanest” in behavioural terms (Grogger, Haider
and Klerman 2003, Klerman and Haider 2001)
because, in contrast to the participation and exit
models, the entry process is not driven by complex
lag processes (i.e., who goes on to SA and how they
work through the system). The detailed tables are
available in the Appendix.
Lone parents currently not on SA (remember that
their rates are always high – meaning that this is in
some sense a more select group than for the other
family types) have the highest probability of
entering SA in any given year, with rates of about 
10 percent at the baseline. Singles come next, at 
3.0 percent, followed by couples with and without
children (1.45 and a little over .76 percent, 
respectively).
A higher unemployment rate greatly increases the
probability of entering SA. The same is true for the
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SA benefit level coefficients. Thus, at least part of
the manner in which these economic-policy
variables appear to affect SA participation rates at
any point in time – and to have contributed to the
observed declines in the numbers receiving SA in
the late 1990s and into the new millennium – is
through their effects on entry rates. Except for single
parents, the EI generosity index effects points to the
“gateway” hypothesis: reduced EI generosity leads to
reduced (not increased – as many provinces alleged
over this time) SA entry rates. 
The year effects show that some of the other
policy measures discussed above may indeed have
had the desired effect of reducing entry onto 
SA – especially in the case of singles and single
parents.
THE EXIT MODELS: WHO IS LEAST LIKELYTO LEAVE
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE?The exit models are
estimated for those observed to enter a spell of SA
over the period in question, and include the same
explanatory variables as the other models plus a
series of dummy variables indicating the elapsed
spell length to capture duration effects, although
those results are not discussed here. The detailed
tables for the exit model are available in an online
appendix at www.cdhowe.org.
23
The baseline exit rates, which correspond to the
probability of exiting SA after being on SA just
one year (as well as the other baseline values
described above), vary a great deal by family type.
Single parents have by far the lowest rate, at just
20.2 percent. Singles come next, at 34.3 percent.
Couples have the highest rates of exiting SA, on
the order of 45-56 percent – that is almost half (or
more) appear to collect SA for just a single year.
Lower unemployment significantly speeds exits
out of SA, presumably as individuals are able to
find better employment opportunities. These
effects are generally weaker relative to the entry
model. The effects of the EI and SA variables are,
conversely, quite mixed and in many cases statisti-
cally insignificant, so we cannot draw many general
conclusions from them.
The year effects indicate that (holding other
factors constant) individuals exited SA at higher
rates in later years.
24 Interestingly, there is a strong
increase in exit rates for single parents over time
which complement their reduced entry rates seen
above, meaning that their lower annual participa-
tion rates were driven by both lower entry and
higher exit rates.
The other group with children (couples) also
had decidedly higher exit rates (ceteris paribus) in
later years, so policies targeted on families with
children might have had an effect – the changes in
welfare-income support policy as related to the
introduction of the CTB/NCB perhaps being the
best candidate in this respect. The other two
groups showed less in the way of time trends as
captured by the year effects.
The Simulations: What Drove the Trends? 
The study now explores the contribution of each
of the major factors  by graphing their influences
on a year-by-year basis. We do this by taking the
models that have been estimated and first calcu-
lating the probability of each of the outcomes –
participation, entry, exit – with all the values of the
explanatory variables set at their actual mean
values in the first year of data, 1993. We plot this
line across the time period out to the final year,
2005. This is our starting point. Because the
model estimating the impact of these variables on
exit rates is not as clear as participation and entry,
the simulation figures and tables from exit models
are presented separately online. 
We take each of the variables (or sets of variables)
in question and – one at a time – change its values
to those which actually held in each calendar year
and plot the new expected probabilities over time.
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23 This approach is similar to that employed by Gunderson and Melino (1990) to model strike durations, by Ham and Rae (1987) to analyse
durations of joblessness, by Finnie and Sweetman (2003) to model poverty dynamics, and by Finnie and Gray (2002) to model income
dynamics. Keifer (1990) shows how this approach corresponds to a well-defined discrete hazard model, corresponding to the annual data
employed and imposing no structure on the form of the duration effects.
24 The year effects begin with 1994 because a first year is needed to identify those who move onto SA (1993-94 being the earliest entries) –
whose exits are then tracked from that point. | 16 Commentary 267
The graphs thus show the predicted time trends in
the probabilities (i) had their been no change in the
system (i.e., the straight line to start), (ii) allowing
only the unemployment rate to take its true annual
(mean) values over time, (iii) also allowing the EI
generosity index to take its actual annual values, (iv)
also allowing SA benefit levels to take their actual
values, and (v) rounding out the graphs by also
including the estimated calendar year effects. 
Comparing the graphed lines thus allows us to
see the effects of each variable (or set of variables in
the case of the year effects) one at a time. This
exercise is carried out for each of the outcomes for
each of the family types. It is important to empha-
size that the effects are presented in the graphs
cumulatively, and that the differences between
each graphed line represents the additional effect
of the factor in question (unemployment rate, EI,
SA, etc.). While most of the factors had the effect
of lowering SA rates over time, some did not, at
least for certain specific outcomes for certain
specific groups. 
TRENDS IN PARTICIPATION RATES: Figures 4a-d show
the relevant graphs for the (annual) SA participation
rates for each of the family types. “Baseline” shows
the flat line where all the variables included in the
models are set at their 1993 (mean) values, and thus
generate probabilities that are close to the actual
rates shown in Figure 1a, as should be the case in a
well-specified model.
The second series then allows individuals’
demographic characteristics (sex, age, province,
language, area size of residence) to change over time,
and shows the predicted probabilities generated by
the model in each year. The effects are generally
small, although they do contribute to the downward
trends in SA rates to some degree for the attached
with children and lone-parent groups. (We do not
explore the particular characteristics which are
changing – preferring again to focus on the more
policy relevant variables.) 
The third series then shows the fitted probabilities
when the unemployment rate is allowed to take on
its actual values over time, and the graphs clearly
show the strong influence of this variable, as
indicated by the significant downward shift in the
fitted values once the actual unemployment rates are
factored in, the strength of the effects varying
somewhat from group to group. This strong influ-
ence on the time trends is the result of (i) the
sizeable effects of the unemployment rate on SA
rates found in the regression models in combination
with (ii) the substantial declines in unemployment
rates over time.
Next comes the EI generosity index, which has a
generally smaller, but still significant effect. SA
benefit levels follow, and the effects are again
stronger, although not as great as those found for
the unemployment rate. Finally, the year effects are
added, and actually indicate positive shifts for most
groups in most years (the graph lines including the
year effects are in many cases above those of the
preceding ones), the important exception being
single parents, who exhibit a strong negative trend
due to the estimated calendar year effects – that is,
the shifts that occurred after all the other variables
included in the models have been factored in.
While these graphs are informative and contain
considerable detail, we now turn to the final set of
information presented in Tables 2 and 3 for SA
participation and entry. The first row for each
family group details the percentage share of each of
the factors on the overall change over the complete
period, 1994 to 2005. The second row for each
family group shows the percentage point impact of
each variable (or set of variables) in each year on the
predicted probabilities. 
So, for example, among singles (first row of Table
2), the predicted probability of being on SA
declined by 6.13 percentage points from 1994 to
2005, as indicated in the last column. Of this
change, the decline in unemployment rates
contributed 3.95 percentage points, or 64.5 percent
of the total decline. The next most important factor
was the change in SA benefit levels, which
contributed to a 2.06 percentage point decline, or
33.7 percent of the total. The EI index was respon-
sible for a decline of .88 percentage points, or 14.3
percent of the total; the change in demographic
characteristics would actually have led to an increase
in rates; and the residual year effects were relatively
small. The other rows in the table show the same
thing for the other family groups.
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Figure 4a:  Factors Contributing to the Decline in SA Rates – Single
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Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).
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Figure 4d:  Factors Contributing to the Decline in SA Rates – Lone Parent





























Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).
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Group Demography Unemployment
Rate
EI Benefits SA Benefits Year Effect Total
Singles Percentage Share of
Impact on SA Rate
-18.1 64.5 14.3 33.7 5.6 100
Percentage Point Change in
SA Rate 1994-2005
1.11 -3.95 -0.88 -2.06 -0.34 -6.13
Attached no Child Percentage Share of
Impact on SA Rate
18.1 48.6 7.0 29.7 -3.3 100
Percentage Point Change in
SA Rate 1994-2005
-0.72 -1.93 -0.28 -1.19 0.13 -3.98
Attached with Child Percentage Share of
Impact on SA Rate
5.2 63.3 20.5 28.7 -17.6 100
Percentage Point Change in
SA Rate 1994-2005
-0.10 -1.21 -0.39 -0.55 0.34 -1.91
Lone Parent Percentage Share of
Impact on SA Rate














Table 2. Factors Contributing to the Decline in SA Rates
Group Demography Unemployment
Rate
EI Benefits SA Benefits Year Effect Total
Singles Percentage Share of
Impact on SA Rate
0.4 28.3 16.6 17.7 37.0 100
Percentage Point Change in
SA Rate 1994/95-2004/05
-0.01 -0.75 -0.44 -0.47 -0.99 -2.66
Attached no Child Percentage Share of
Impact on SA Rate
3.6 34.9 17.0 11.2 33.3 100
Percentage Point Change in
SA Rate 1994/95-2004/05
-0.02 -0.21 -0.10 -0.07 -0.20 -0.59
Attached with Child Percentage Share of
Impact on SA Rate
8.5 28.7 24.5 19.2 19.2 100
Percentage Point Change in
SA Rate 1994/95-2004/05
-0.09 -0.29 -0.25 -0.20 -0.20 -1.03
Lone Parent Percentage Share of
Impact on SA Rate














Table 3. Factors Contributing to the Decline in SA Entry Rates
Given that the effects of virtually all of the impor-
tant variables are statistically significant, these results
indicate that both economic conditions and incen-
tives were important in reducing SA dependency in
this period. That is, changes in the unemployment
rate, SA benefit levels, and the generosity of the EI
system explain most of the observed declines in SA
participation rates, with their magnitudes of impor-
tance coming generally in that order – albeit it with
some variation from group to group. 
An important exception is worth emphasizing:
the pattern for lone parents. For this group, the year
effects are in fact almost as important as benefit
levels, which may mean that the unmodelled policy
measures discussed earlier had their intended effects,
or that some other influence, such as the
CTB/NCB was a determining factor. Also inter-
esting, is that the general decreases in SA benefit
levels available to lone parents played the most
important role, while the effects of the decline in the
unemployment rate came third, and the changes in
the EI system actually worked against the declines
for this group (and this group only). Demographic
changes had a mixed set of effects.
Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).
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ENTRY RATES:The same graphical results for entry
rates are shown in Figures 5a-d and Table 3. Here
the calendar year effects are important, as are the
declines in the unemployment rate. The latter
explains about 30 percent of the overall declines.
The decreased generosity of the EI system generally
comes next in importance, except for single parents,
for whom the effects are negligible. The decline in
SA benefit rates contributes in the range of 11 to 24
percent of the total decreases, the effects being
greatest for single parents.
EXIT RATES:The exit models are not as powerful as
the entry and participation models in explaining
observed patterns. This is not surprising on account
of the complex lags, duration effects and composi-
tion effects that are associated with the exit process.
For example, as entry rates declined over time, it is
likely that only a harder core of welfare recipients
were left in the samples of SA participants for whom
exit rates are estimated. This would tend to drive
exit rates down, rather than up, and otherwise
confound the estimation with unobserved hetero-
geneity. This pattern has been found in the work of
several US studies (for example, Grogger 2002 and
Klerman and Haider 2001) that accordingly
emphasize the importance of the entry processes.
Furthermore, from a policy perspective, preventing
entry is a more attractive approach than getting
individuals off welfare, once there. Finally – and
related – the time trends are not so strong, or 
consistent across groups and over different periods.
Again, exit models are presented in the online
Supplementary Data Appendix.
Conclusion
The reduction in SA use in Canada from the early
1990s through to the present day has been of
historic proportions. We have described the general
economic and policy setting that underlay this
decline; shown the general trends in participation,
entry, and exit rates; and provided an empirical
analysis of the principal factors that have driven this
change. These factors include economic conditions
(as captured by the unemployment rate), the levels
of benefits available to SA recipients, the generosity
of the EI system (on the assumption that SA and EI
may be functionally related for potential SA recipi-
ents), and a set of calendar year variables to capture
other policy-related developments. 
All these factors matter. First, macroeconomic
conditions have an extremely strong impact on SA
rates. The decline in the unemployment rate from a
high of 12 percent in 1993 to between 6 and 7
percent at the end of the period of analysis was the
single most important factor in reducing the
incidence of SA benefits, as well as the underlying
annual entry rates that play such an important role
in driving those annual levels.
Second, incentives related to income support
programs also matter greatly. SA participation rates
appear to be significantly affected by the dollar value
of the benefits available from the program, and the
fall in the real dollar value of SA benefits after the
mid-1990s played an important role in reducing SA
rates over our period of analysis. Furthermore, a less
generous EI system appears to decrease (not increase)
SA rates, suggesting the programs are complements
rather than substitutes, and changes in the EI
program also contributed to the decline in SA rates.
Third, other policy changes appear to have had
additional effects. Welfare reforms that limited eligi-
bility or otherwise made it more difficult to collect
SA, as well as changes in other income support
programs such as the CTB/NCB appear to have
further driven SA rates downward. On this count,
however, the evidence is not as direct, since it is
based on the calendar year effects in the models,
which also capture other influences not explicitly
specified. Conversely, to the degree some of the SA
program changes, in particular, have been correlated
with the changes in SA benefit levels (e.g., rule
changes instituted at the same time rates were cut),
some of the effects of the former may be captured in
the latter.
These results are consistent with Richards (2007).
He proposes that the improving macroeconomy,
combined with greater incentives to join the labour
market as a result of changes to SA and EI, and an
expanded NCB program, together dramatically
reduced the rate of poverty (the focus of his analysis)
nationally during the period 1995–2005. Our study
also emphasizes the flow nature of SA. The numberCommentary 267 | 21
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Figure 5a:  Factors Contributing to the Decline in SA Entry Rates – Single




















































Figure 5b:  Factors Contributing to the Decline in SA Entry Rates – Attached with Child



















































Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).
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Figure 5c:  Factors Contributing to the Decline in SA Entry Rates – Attached no Child




















































Figure 5d:  Factors Contributing to the Decline in SA Entry Rates – Lone Parent




















































Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).
Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).of individuals receiving SA in any time period is
augmented by new entries and depleted by new
exits, but the entry dynamic seems to have been the
principal driver in the change in the number of SA
caseloads.
This analysis has also found that individuals in
households of different structures respond differ-
ently to macroeconomic conditions, to changed
incentives in program benefits (SA and EI), and to
other program changes. Of particular note is that
single-parent households experienced dramatic
declines in entry rates and increases in exit rates, and
the relative importance of the different factors
underlying these trends was substantially different
than for other groups, with the improved economy
playing a relatively smaller role as compared to other
groups. One factor in driving these single-parent
trends, and behaviour, may have been a change in
the composition of the single-parent population,
which has been becoming older and more educated
over time.
Finally, it is important to point out some of the
limitations of this study. No attempt was made to
model the SA behaviour of individuals living on
First Nations reserves or the disabled. And of course
our analysis is only as strong as the models we
estimate, and as in any such analysis, some of the
variables included in the specification may capture
other influences not represented with which they are
correlated. Still, the study is quite original in how it
attempts to model SA behaviour – including partici-
pation, entry, and exit rates at the national level over
a critical period of policy developments and changes
in SA behaviour; and the LAD data used in the
analysis is well suited to the task.
What then can we say in broader policy terms?
First, the notion  that individuals on SA simply do
not want to – and will not – work is demonstrably
untrue. The most significant influence on SA rates
appears to be the availability of jobs, and it was the
substantial strengthening of the economy after 1996
that had the greatest effect in driving SA rates
downwards over the period of our study.
Second, the perspective that SA benefit rates –
and the benefits of other related income support
programs – have no effect on SA participation rates,
and that cutting benefits will only punish those who
have no choice but to be on SA also appears incor-
rect. More generous SA benefit rates appear to
attract more individuals onto SA, as do more
generous EI benefits.
This said, our study does not say what SA benefit
levels should be, or whether the cuts that came after
the mid-1990s caused more harm than good –
harm in the form of leaving vulnerable individuals
less well off; good in the form of improving govern-
ments’ fiscal positions and, more directly, keeping
employable individuals off the SA rolls and perhaps
otherwise more actively engaged in the economic
and social mainstream. We say only that benefit
levels matter to participation rates and this is a
factor that needs to be taken into account in the
relevant policy discussions.
Similarly, we cannot say if the other kinds of 
SA reforms adopted over this period, such as those
which limited eligibility or otherwise made SA 
more difficult to obtain, were a good thing or a bad
thing in these same terms. But we can say that such
reforms do indeed appear to have affected SA 
participation rates.
We believe that the major contribution of this
analysis is that future discussions regarding SA – 
and SA policy reform – can be based on a stronger
empirical basis than before.
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A baseline probability represents the predicted probability of being on SA for an “average individual” – thus
representing a person aged 25-39 living in a large urban area in Ontario in 1993 – and the continuous
(economic-policy) variables (unemployment rate, EI generosity, and SA benefit levels) set to their sample
means. The baseline probabilities provide the point of departure for calculating the effects of each of the
variables included in the models, and a point of comparison for the magnitudes of the effects found. The
lowest rates are for couples, especially those without children (5-7 percent), singles come next (14.5 percent),
while lone parents have the highest rates (43.6 percent).
The effects of the variables of interest are presented in terms of the associated changes in the probability
that a person is on SA –  Marginal Effect column – associated with a specified unit change in each of the
variables. The unemployment rate effects shown are calculated for a one-point increase, the SA benefit effects
are those associated with a $1,000 increase in the amounts available to recipients, the EI index effects are those
associated with an increase of one standard deviation in that measure, and the year variables capture the differ-
ence between the year in question and the baseline year (1993) with regard to, for example, rule changes that
make eligibility for welfare more difficult.
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Baseline (1993) 14.53 7.40  5.16 43.64
Economic Vars.
Unemployment Rate 15.26 0.73 7.96 0.56 5.53 0.37 45.26 1.62
EI Index(100) 14.83 0.30 7.57 0.18 5.41 0.25 42.17 -1.47
S.A. Ben. Lev. (1,000$) 15.43 0.90 8.01 0.62 5.46 0.30 46.47 2.83
Year 
1994 15.40 0.86 8.44 1.04 5.75 0.59 45.03 1.39
1995 16.72 2.19 9.92 2.52 6.59 1.43 47.63 3.99
1996 16.26 1.73 10.93 3.54 6.55 1.39 49.15 5.51
1997 16.56 2.03 11.10 3.70 6.74 1.58 48.80 5.16
1998 16.57 2.03 11.03 3.63 6.95 1.79 46.80 3.16
1999 15.97 1.44 9.81 2.41 6.60 1.44 41.90 -1.74
2000 15.92 1.39 9.56 2.16 6.70 1.55 40.43 -3.21
2001 15.21 0.68 8.74 1.35 6.44 1.28 36.59 -7.05
2002 14.25 -0.29 7.75 0.35 5.62 0.46 35.13 -8.51
2003 13.87 -0.66 7.52* 0.12 5.24* 0.08 34.02 -9.61
2004 14.55* 0.02 7.73 0.33 5.57 0.41 34.27 -9.36
2005 14.17 -0.37 7.71 0.31 5.88 0.72 32.82 -10.81
* Indicates not significant at 95% confidence level
Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).Commentary 267 | 25
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Baseline (1993 – 1994)  3.00 1.45 0.76 9.70
Economic Vars.
Unemployment Rate 3.14 0.14 1.53 0.08 0.81 0.05 10.06 0.36
EI Index (100) 3.15 0.15 1.60 0.15 0.81 0.05 9.73* 0.03
S.A. Ben. Lev. (1,000$) 3.20 0.21 1.54 0.09 0.78 0.02 10.20 0.49
Year 
1994-1995 2.71 -0.29 1.35 -0.10 0.72 -0.04 8.41 -1.30
1995-1996 2.49 -0.51 1.47* 0.02 0.69 -0.07 7.31 -2.40
1996-1997 2.62 -0.38 1.38 -0.07 0.69 -0.07 7.79 -1.92
1997-1998 2.34 -0.66 1.30 -0.15 0.63 -0.13 7.12 -2.59
1998-1999 2.14 -0.86 1.20 -0.25 0.60 -0.16 6.79 -2.91
1999-2000 2.00 -1.00 1.12 -0.33 0.55 -0.21 6.20 -3.50
2000-2001 2.13 -0.87 1.19 -0.25 0.58 -0.18 6.39 -3.31
2001-2002 1.87 -1.13 1.26 -0.19 0.60 -0.16 6.25 -3.45
2002-2003 1.99 -1.01 1.17 -0.28 0.50 -0.26 6.61 -3.09
2003-2004 1.94 -1.06 1.19 -0.25 0.54 -0.22 6.84 -2.86
2004-2005 1.90 -1.10 1.06 -0.39 0.49 -0.27 6.49 -3.22
* Indicates not significant at 95% confidence level
Source: Authors’ calculations, Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).
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